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* Harmony and Relations  
1. Harmony is unity in variety [unitas in varietate]. […] Harmony is when many things are reduced 
to some unity. For where there is no variety, there is no harmony […]. In turn, where variety is 
without order, without proportion, there is no harmony. Hence, it is evident that the greater the 
variety and the unity in variety, the greater the harmony […]. Now from this it is clearly evident 
that Harmony is perfect cogitability. For it was said […] that the more perfect is that in which 
there is more reality. But thinking is also a kind of reality, and so much the greater because the 
things thought of are in a way multiplied, for individual minds contain some representation of 
the whole world. Hence, that is a more perfect manner of thinking, where one act of thought 
extends to many things simultaneously, for in this way there is more reality in that thought. This 
is done, moreover, with the work of relations, for a relation is a kind of unity in multiplicity 
[quaedam unitas in multis]. And species of relations are the connections and reasons of things 
among themselves, the proportions, the proportionalities. It is from all of these taken at the same 
time in a given object that harmony results. (Elementa Verae Pietatis, A VI, iv, p. 1358-1360) 
 
* Substances as Living Mirrors  
2. Nature is uniform in its variety, uniform qua principles, but varied qua modes. (Commentatio 
de anima brutorum, GP VII, p. 329) 
3. This is as if God has varied the universe as many times as there are souls, or as if he has created 
as many abridged universes, fundamentally agreeing, but diversified through appearances. 
There is nothing so rich as this uniform simplicity accompanied by a perfect order. (Letter to 
Sophie-Charlotte, GP III, p. 347) 
4. [F]or when God turns, so to speak, on all sides and in all fashions, the general system of 
phenomena which he finds it good to produce for the sake of manifesting his glory, and when 
he regards all the aspects of the world in all possible manners, since there is no relation which 
escapes his omniscience, the result of each view of the universe as seen from a different position 
is a substance which expresses the universe conformably to this view. (Discourse of 
Metaphysics, §14) 
5. When we say that every Monad, Soul, Spirit has received a particular law, we should add that 
this is nothing but a variety of the general law that rules the whole universe, analogously to the 
fact that the same town appears different according to the different points of view it is seen 
from. (Remarks on Bayle’s Dictionary, art. Rorarius, GP IV, p. 553)  
6.  [T]his interconnection, or this adapting of all created things to each one, and of each one to all 
the others, brings it about that each simple substance has relational properties that express all 
the others, so that each monad is a perpetual living mirror of the universe. / And just as the same 
town when seen from different sides will seem quite different – as though it were multiplied 
perspectivally – the same thing happens here: because of the infinite multitude of simple 
substances it is as though there were that many different universes; but they are all perspectives 
on the same one, differing according to the different points of view of the monads. / And that is 
the way to get the greatest possible variety, but with all the order there could be, that is, it is the 





* Universal Connection  
7. In my opinion, there is nothing in the whole created universe which does not need, for its perfect 
concept, the concept of everything else in the universality of things, since everything flow into 
every other thing in such a way that if anything is removed or changes, everything in the world 
will be different from what it is now. (Letter to De Volder, GP II, p. 226) 
8. There is no term which is so absolute or so detached that it does not involve relations and is not 
such that a complete analysis of it would lead to other things and indeed to all other things, so 
that you can say that relative terms indicate expressly the relation they contain. (New Essays, II, 
xxv, §5) 
 
9. It can even be said that […] all things harmonize – σύμπνοια πάντα, as Hippocrates put it –, and 
that eyes as piercing as God’s could read in the lowliest substance the universe’s whole sequence 
of events; quae sint, quae fuerint, quae mox future trahantur [those which are, which have been 
and which will happen in the future. (New Essays, Preface) 
10. It is all too true that there is no part of nature that could be known perfectly by us, and the very 
interconnection of things [περιχώρησις rerum] proves this. No creature, however elevated, can 
perceive distinctly or comprehend the infinite at the same time; but, on the contrary, whoever 
comprehends even one part of matter likewise comprehends the whole universe on account of 
the same interconnection [περιχώρησις] I mentioned. My principles are such that they can hardly 
be separated one from another. Whoever knows one well, knows them all. (Letter to Des Bosses, 
GP II, p. 412) 
11. If we consider the thing correctly, it seems impossible that a proposition concerning any subject 
should become false without any change taking place within it. Indeed the world is practically 
one single individual [Nimirum Mundus est quasi unum], and any thing is influenced by all the 
others. (A VI, iv, p. 308) 
12. It must be known that all things are connected in each one of the possible worlds: the universe, 
whatever it may be, is all of one piece, like an Ocean: the least movement extends its effect 
there to any distance whatsoever […]. Therein God has ordered all things beforehand once for 
all […]; and each thing as an idea has contributed, before its existence, to the resolution that has 
been made upon the existence of all things; so that nothing can be changed in the universe (any 
more than in a number) save its essence or, if you will, save its numerical individuality. 
(Theodicy, §9) 
 
* No Purely Extrinsic Denominations 
13. Philalethes. However, a change of relation can occur without there having been any change in 
the subject: Titius, “whom I consider today as a father, ceases to be so tomorrow, only by the 
death of his son, without any alteration in himself”. 
Theophilus. That can very well be said if we are guided by the things of which we are aware; 
but in metaphysical strictness there is no purely extrinsic denomination (denominatio pure 
extrínseca), because of the real connection amongst all things (New Essays, II, xxv, §5) 
14. [T]here are no extrinsic denominations, and no one becomes a widower in India by the death of 
his wife in Europe unless a real change occurs in him. For every predicate is in fact contained 
in the nature of the subject. (De modo distinguendi phaenomena realia ab imaginariis, GP VII, 
p. 321-322) 
15. It is undeniable that, when the mind perceives something in matter, whilst it perceives various 
things there is also a change in it. When someone, by growing, becomes bigger than me, then 
some change occurs in me as well, since a denomination of mine is changed. In this way, all 







16. When one considers in Adam a part of his predicates, for example, that he is the first man, set 
in a garden of pleasure, from whose side God fashioned a woman, and similar things conceived 
sub ratione generalitatis, in a general way (that is to say, without naming Eve, Paradise, and 
other circumstances that fix individuality), […] all this is not sufficient to determine the 
individual, for there can be an infinity of Adams, that is, an infinity of possible persons, different 
from one another, whom this fits. […] Therefore, we must not conceive of a vague Adam, that 
is, a person to whom certain attributes of Adam belong, when we are concerned with 
determining whether all human events follow from his assumption; rather, we must attribute to 
him a notion so complete that everything that can be attributed to him can be deduced from it. 
[…] It, therefore, also follows that he would not have been our Adam, but another Adam, had 
other events happened to him, for nothing prevents us from saying that he would be another. 
Therefore, he is another. (Letter to Arnauld, GP II, p. 41-42) 
17. There is contained in this complete notion of a possible Peter, which I concede is observed by 
God, not only the essential or the necessary, namely, that which flows from incomplete or 
specific notions, and which are demonstrated from terms so that the contrary implies a 
contradiction, but also the existential or contingent so to speak are contained therein, because it 
is of the nature of an individual substance that its nature be perfect and complete. (De Libertate, 
Fato, Gratia Dei, A, VI, iv, p. 1600) 
18. And this notion of the complete individual includes, I believe, relationships with the whole 
series of things […]. (Letter to Arnauld, GP II, p. 37) 
19. [T]he concept of an individual substance includes all its events and all its denominations, even 
those which are commonly called extrinsic, that is, those which pertains to it only by virtue of 
the general connection of things and from the fact that it expresses the whole universe in its own 
way. (Letter to Arnauld, GP II, p. 56) 
 
* Reformation of the Notion of Substance 
20. I do not know if the definition of substance as that which requires only the concurrence of God 
to exist fits any created substance known to us, unless we interpret it in some less usual sense. 
For not only do we require other substances, but we require our accidents even more. 
(Animadversiones in partem generalem Principiorum Cartesianorum, GP IV, p. 364) 
 
21. All substances are co-requisites for each other. (Notes on Cordemoy, A VI, iv, p. 1800) 
 
* Leibnizian Monism 
22. It can easily be demonstrated that all things are distinguished, not as substances (i.e., radically) 
but as modes. This can be demonstrated from the fact that, of those things which are radically 
distinct, one can be perfectly understood without another; that is, all the requisites of the one 
can be understood without all the requisites of the other being understood. But in the case of 
things, this is not so; for since the ultimate reason of things is unique, and contains by itself the 
aggregate of all requisites of all things, it is evident that the requisites of all things are the same. 
So also is their essence, given that an essence is the aggregate of all primary requisites. 
Therefore the essence of all things is the same, and things differ only modally, just as a town 
seen from a high point differs from the town seen from a plain. If only those things are really 
different which can be separated, or, of which one can be perfectly understood without the other, 
it follows that no thing really differs from another, but that all things are one, just as Plato argues 
in the Parmenides. (Quod Ens Perfectissimus Sit Possibile, A, VI, iii, p. 573) 
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23. There is the same variety in any kind of world, and this is nothing other than the same essence 
related in various ways, as if you were to look at the same town from various places; or, if you 
relate the essence of number 6 to the number 3, it will be 3 X 2 or 3 + 3, but if you relate it to 
the number 4 it will be 6/4 = 3/2, or 6 = 4 X 3/2. So it is not surprising that, in a certain way, 
different things are produced. (De Formis Simplicibus, A VI, iii, p. 523) 
24. It seems to me that the origin of things from God is of the same kind as the origin of properties 
from an essence […]. So just as these properties differ from each other and from essence, so do 
things differ from each other and from God. (De Origine Rerum Ex Formis, A VI, iii, p. 518-
519) 
 
* On the Trinity 
25. A person in general is a substance, single in number, and incommunicable, which in God 
essentially involves relations and constitutes, with its correlatives, an absolute substance in 
number. (Examen Religionis Christianae, A VI, iv, p. 2365) 
26. [W]e do not say that persons are relations, but that they are constituted trough relations [per 
relations constitui]. (Ad Christophori Stegmanni Metaphysicam Unitariorum, p. 188) 
27. One should then say that there are relations within the divine substance that distinguish the 
persons from each other; since these persons cannot be absolute substances. But one should also 
say that these relations must be substantial and that they are not sufficiently explained by 
modalities. Also one should say that the divine persons are not the same concrete being, under 
different denominations […], as one man could be both a poet and an orator; but three different 
concrete relative beings in a single absolute concrete being [trois différents concrets respectifs, 
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